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I. INTRODUCTION
As foreclosure forces millions of Americans to leave their
homes, their abandoned properties become the new homes to
crime, toxic waste, vermin and insects, and an increased risk of
fire.' Along with such blight, abandoned homes negatively impact
surrounding homes' values. This combination of decreased home
ownership, home occupation, and property values significantly
reduces tax revenues to cash-strapped state and local
governments.' Experts predict that foreclosure blight could
ultimately cost governments hundreds of billions of dollars.4 Some
* This Note is part of the North Carolina Banking Institute Symposium on the
Foreclosure Crisis.
** I gratefully acknowledge Sean T. Seelinger and Kathryn E. Johnson for their
contributions of valuable research and assistance.
1. Creola Johnson, Fight Blight: Cities Sue to Hold Lenders Responsible for the
Rise in Foreclosures and Abandoned Properties, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1169, 1182-83,
1198 (2008) (promoting nuisance litigation as opposed to individual proceedings as a
solution to the foreclosure blight). See, e.g., Raymond L. Pianka, Nuisances,
http://www.clevelandhousingcourt.org/hc-rd-g.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2010)
(explaining the need for Cleveland residents to maintain their homes). Abandoned
homes lead to an increased presence of drug dealers, gangs, and prostitutes, and an
increased murder rate. The "Broken Windows Theory," first introduced by
criminologists James Q. Wilson and George Kelling, explains this pattern and
suggests that minor disrepair or a showing of vacancy creates the assumption that the
home is in a state of disorder and lacks supervision. The projection of chaos spreads
and individuals feel less inhibited to commit crimes. Id.
2. G. THOMAS KINGSLEY, ET AL., THE IMPACTS OF FORECLOSURES ON FAMILIES
AND COMMUNITIES 17 (2009), http://www.urban.orglUploadedPDF/411909_impact
offorclosures.pdf.
3. Johnson, supra note 1, at 1181; Joseph Schilling, Code Enforcement and
Community Stabilization: The Forgotten First Responders to Vacant and Foreclosed
Homes, 2 ALB. GOV'T L. REV. 101, 111-12 (2009) (explaining the significant costs to
the community that abandoned homes pose).
4. Raymond H. Brescia, Tainted Loans: The Value of a Mass Tort Approach to
Subprime Mortgage Litigation, (Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 16, 49
2009), 78 U. CIN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) [hereinafter Brescia, Tainted Loans],
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1420792 (advocating the mass tort actions in
litigation against banks); Raymond H. Brescia, Subprime Communities: Reverse
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
cities have sought to address the cost of foreclosures by seeking to
hold mortgage lenders accountable in court for the maintenance
costs and lost tax revenue associated with foreclosure blight.5
Litigation, however, has been relatively unsuccessful to date.6
Furthermore, even when cities prevail against lenders in court, the
time and cost associated with litigation makes it an inefficient
means of addressing foreclosure blight.7 The Neighborhood
Stabilization Program (NSP), however, has shown promising signs
of providing cities a way to address foreclosure blight.8
Part II of this Note will describe the various litigation
approaches that cities have used to address foreclosure blight.9
Part II will also explain the shortcomings of such approaches and
conclude that litigation is ineffective as a primary strategy to
address foreclosure blight.'1 Part III will explain why the NSP is a
novel and innovative solution for cities facing increasing numbers
of abandoned homes in the wake of the foreclosure crisis." The
Note concludes in Part IV that while the NSP has shortcomings in
its current form, Congress should improve the program and fund it
on a recurring basis to provide cities with a sustainable way to
address foreclosure blight. 2
II. LITIGATION TO FIGHT IMPACT OF FORECLOSURES
Cities have used a variety of legal theories to sue banks to
recoup lost tax revenues and to allay increased maintenance costs
Redlining, the Fair Housing Act, and Emerging Issues in Litigation Regarding the
Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 2 ALB. Gov'T L. REV. 164, 168-70 (2009).
5. Johnson, supra note 1. Mass litigation or large-scale litigation in this capacity
allows cities to sue lenders for thousands of abandoned properties in a single suit.
6. See infra Part II, pp. 258-67. See generally id. (discussing the shortcomings of
individual proceedings and illustrating the lack of success of mass litigation).
7. See infra Part II, pp. 258-67.
8. See infra Part III.A, pp. 268-71.
9. See infra Part II, pp. 258-67.
10. See infra Part II, pp. 258-67.
11. See infra Part III, pp. 267-73. See also Kathryn E. Johnson & Carolyn E.
Waldrep, Note, The North Carolina Banking Institute Symposium on the Foreclosure
Crisis: Overview, 14 N.C. BANKING INST. 191, 208-12, (2010) (explaining background
on the foreclosure crisis and the legislation that enacted NSP).
12. See infra Part IV, pp. 273-74.
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associated with foreclosed and abandoned properties." They
involve both civil and criminal proceedings regarding individual
properties and mass litigation suits seeking to hold property
owner(s) responsible for multiple properties in a single action.'
4
While litigation may compensate cities and states for lost tax
revenue and maintenance costs, these methods are an inefficient
and ineffective means of providing relief to blighted cities."5
A. Individual Proceedings
Civil suits by cities against individual properties often
involve nuisance abatement actions. 6 Cities may have standing to
pursue public nuisance claims under statutory or common law. 7
13. Johnson, supra note 1, at 1187; Brescia, Tainted Loans, supra note 4, at 47-48;
see, e.g., City of Cleveland v. Ameriquest Mortg. Sec., Inc., 621 F. Supp.2d 513 (N.D.
Ohio 2009) (attempting to hold twenty investment banks for public nuisance created
by foreclosed homes); Complaint, Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A., 631 F. Supp.2d 702 (D. Md. 2008) (No. L08CV 062), available at
2008 WL 117894 (alleging that lenders had engaged in reverse redlining giving rise to
increased foreclosures and causing harm to the City).
14. Johnson, supra note 1, at 1195-98; see also infra Part II.A-B.
15. See generally Johnson, supra note 1, at 1198 (arguing that individual
proceedings are too costly and time consuming to adequately address problems
caused by foreclosed and abandoned properties).
16. Johnson, supra note 1, at 1187; see also Katherine C. Engel, Do Cities Have
Standing? Redressing the Externalities of Predatory Lending, 38 CONN. L. REV. 355,
382 (2006) ("Public nuisance claims are an age-old tool used by government entities
to pursue lenders who engage in unlawful and unsavory lending practices."). Often,
city officials have difficulty finding a party responsible for the foreclosed or
abandoned property because "the complexities of the foreclosure process and the
national and global nature of the lending industry." Schilling, supra note 3, at 124-25.
17. Engel, supra note 16, at 384-85. See e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 19-2.1 (2009)
(stating that parties with standing include a "county [or] municipality"); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3767.41 (2009) (indicating that parties with standing include a
"municipal corporation [or] township"); Camden County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders
v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 123 F. Supp.2d 245, 265 (D.N.J. 2000) (holding that
"municipalities such as Camden County have general statutory and constitutional
standing to sue in order to abate public nuisances"). In some jurisdictions, other
parties, including nearby property owners, may also bring an action for nuisance
abatement; see, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 19-2.1 (stating that parties with standing
include "the Attorney General, the district attorney, county, municipality, or any
private citizen of the county"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3767.41 (indicating that
parties with standing to bring abatement actions include a "municipal corporation,
township, neighbor, tenant, or nonprofit corporation"). See also Johnson, supra note
1, at 1189 (discussing standing in public nuisance claims).
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These suits often arise in connection with receivership proceedings
and tax foreclosure actions."
Receiverships do not result in a transfer of legal title, but
allow for the appointment of a receiver to supervise rehabilitation
of the property." A receiver is only appointed when neither the
owner of the property nor other interested parties have rectified
the nuisance following a judicial order.20 To some degree, this
combination of nuisance abatement and receivership is effective
because the property owner(s), rather than the community, will
bear the financial burden of maintenance and rehabilitation costs.
2
1
By contrast, cities may initiate foreclosure proceedings
when other efforts to collect property taxes or nuisance code
violation fines have failed.22 Foreclosure proceedings allow cities
to acquire title to the abandoned properties.23 Problematically,
some of these foreclosure actions may last more than three years.24
When compared to receiverships, foreclosure proceedings are an
ineffective solution because they leave the city, rather than the
owner, with the financial burden of maintaining an abandoned
property.2 Furthermore, while individual civil proceedings and
the acquisition of vacant homes are useful in combating the effects
of foreclosure, the relative cost and time required for individual
26proceedings outweigh their benefits.
18. Johnson, supra note 1, at 1187.
19. Id. at 1188-89.
20. Id. at 1191 (discussing receivership under Ohio state law); see generally James
J. Kelly, Jr., Refreshing the Heart of the City: Vacant Building Receivership As a Tool
for Neighborhood Revitalization and Community Empowerment, 13 J. AFFORDABLE
HOUSING 210, 218 (Winter 2004) (noting that receiverships are only allowed where
the petitioning party can establish that the nuisance has gone unabated).
21. Johnson, supra note 1, at 1193-94.
22. Id. at 1192-93 (explaining foreclosure proceedings under Ohio state law).
23. Id. at 1188-89.
24. See id. at 1194.
25. See id. at 1192; Kelly, supra note 20, at 211 (arguing that placing blighted
properties in receivership is critical to rehabilitating neighborhoods negatively
affected by the mortgage crisis). In some states, local governments can recover costs
associated with nuisance abatement via an abatement lien; however, "abatement's
upfront costs act as a disincentive for code enforcement to use against foreclosed
homes as they have limited budgets and the increasing uncertainty of recovering
those costs against insolvent lending institutions." Schilling, supra note 3, at 122.
26. Johnson, supra note 1, at 1198. See also ALAN MALLACH, RESTORING
PROBLEM PROPERTIES: A GUIDE TO NEW JERSEY'S ABANDONED PROPERTY TOOLS
68 (2005), available at http://www.hcdnnj.org/mc/page.do?sitePageld=81510&orgld=
260 [Vol. 14
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Individual criminal nuisance actions against lenders are
also used in limited circumstances to mitigate expenses associated
with abandoned properties.27 For example, housing court judges in
both Cleveland, Ohio and Buffalo, New York have ordered
lenders to pay fines for code violations.2 In Cleveland, these fines
have been as high as $50,000 per property; in Buffalo the fines
have been as much as $15,000.29 Banks that do not pay the fines
may be restricted by a lien from buying or selling properties in the
future. o In Cleveland, public nuisance actions have been tried in
absentia when the lenders fail to appear and the court has entered
default judgments against them.' The Ohio Court of Appeals,
however, held that a corporate defendant could not be tried in
absentia where the defendant had not authorized the proceeding
and had never appeared before the court.3 Although, in Cleveland
v. Destiny Ventures, L.L. C.," decided just three months earlier, the
court held that a corporate defendant could be tried in absentia
even though the defendant did not appear for either the plea or
the trial following notice that the trial would proceed if an agent
hcdnnj (noting that in New Jersey, many proceedings "[demand] that the
municipality or entity go through a legal procedure that involves spending funds not
only on legal expenses, but also for title searches, notices and the cost of preparing a
rehabilitation plan to be submitted to the court."); Brescia, Tainted Loans, supra note
4, at 17 (noting that "[a]ggregation of claims has made the cost of bringing such
litigation far less expensive for plaintiffs").
27. Johnson, supra note 1, at 1195-97.
28. Id. In addition to imposing fines, Judge Nowak of Cleveland has declined to
evict some homeowners in eviction actions brought by the lenders who failed to
comply with the default judgments entered against them. Michael Orey, Dirty Deeds,
Bus. WK., Jan. 3, 2008, available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/contentl
08_02fb4066046083770.htm. This action provides an incentive for lenders to ensure
that foreclosed properties do not become nuisances and that they are kept "in good
condition until a buyer can be found." Id.; Johnson, supra note 1, at 1196.
29. Johnson, supra note 1, at 1196.
30. Orey, supra note 28.
31. See e.g., Cleveland v. Destiny Ventures, L.L.C., No. 91018, slip op. (Ohio Ct.
App. Sept. 11, 2008), available at 2008 WL 4175026 (affirming conviction in absentia
of corporate property owners' violation of municipal codes); Cleveland v. Wash. Mut.
Bank, 179 Ohio App.3d 692 (2008) (overturning conviction in absentia of corporate
property owners' violation of municipal codes).
32. Wash. Mut. Bank, 179 Ohio App.3d at 694-95.
33. Destiny Ventures, No. 91018, slip op. at 3.
20101
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failed to appear.34 The Ohio Supreme Court has granted appeals
in both cases to resolve the split.35
While the cities of Buffalo and Cleveland have seen some
benefits from these criminal actions,36 other cities should consider
the costs and benefits of such an approach. Individual criminal
nuisance actions are time consuming and costly because they
require an independent lawsuit for each property.37 Furthermore,
there is no indication that courts in other jurisdictions will follow
Buffalo and Cleveland's lead. The costs and uncertainty
associated with individual actions suggest that cities should explore
other avenues to deal with substantial foreclosure blight.
B. Mass Litigation
Cities have also employed various legal theories in mass-
litigation suits against lenders and servicers with the goal of
recovering lost tax revenue and maintenance costs38 to minimize
the financial strain arising from the rehabilitation of abandoned
homes and decreasing property tax revenue. 3 Proponents of a
34. Id.
35. Cleveland v. Destiny Ventures, L.L.C., 902 N.E.2d 32 (2009) (granting appeal
to the Ohio Supreme Court); Cleveland v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 907 N.E.2d 1193 (2009)
(granting appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court). See also Joan Mazzolini, Corporate
Owners Owe Housing Court Millions, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 16, 2010, at
B3, available at 2010 WLNR 1009202 (describing the split and noting that both cases
are now before the Ohio Supreme Court).
36. See supra p. 261 and notes 27-31.
37. Johnson, supra note 1, at 1195-97.
38. Brescia, Tainted Loans, supra note 4, at 49; Donna Leinwand, Cities Sue
Home Lenders, USA TODAY, May 15, 2008, available at http://www.usatoday.com/
money/economy/housing/2008-05-15-lenderssuedN.htm; see infra pp. 263, 265 and
notes 42,51, 56.
39. Julie Kay, Empty Homes Spur Cities' Suits, 30 NAT'L L. J. 1 (2008), available
at 5/5/2008 Nat'l L.J. 1, (Col. 1). States are also trying to combat foreclosure costs via
mass litigation. See generally David Streitfeld & John Collins Rudolf, States are
Pondering Fraud Suits Against Banks, N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2009 at B1, available at
2009 WLNR 21915697. Some Attorneys General have alleged that lenders
committed fraud by marketing and selling loans that could not be repaid. Id. Illinois
Attorney General, Lisa Madigan, filed a suit against Wells Fargo alleging predatory
lending in violation of Illinois civil rights laws. Id. Meanwhile, Attorney General of
Arizona, Terry Goddard, remarked that he would prefer a better solution to the
foreclosure crisis than a victory in the courtroom, but he believes that litigation is the
only viable solution at this point. Id. Goddard said that at first, the states tried to use
the threat of Cuomo v. Clearing House as a "tool to be persuasive with the banks....
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mass-litigation approach to addressing foreclosure blight argue
that consolidating actions is cost-saving.40 While mass litigation
may be more economical than individual suits, municipalities have
had little success in these matters.41
The City of Cleveland sought to hold more than twenty
notable investment banks liable by classifying foreclosure blight as
a public nuisance.42 In this case, City of Cleveland v. Ameriquest
Mortgage Securities, Inc., 3 the City alleged that the defendant
banks encouraged irresponsible subprime lending through
securitization, which inevitably increased foreclosures." The court
found that because the plaintiff alleged that the defendants were
maintaining a qualified public nuisance,45 the plaintiff must
but their waterfall of excuses, the abysmal number of modifications, tells us
persuasion is not working .... we're moving much closer to litigation." Id.
40. Brescia, Tainted Loans, supra note 4, at 20.
41. See infra pp. 264-66 and notes 47-61. But see City of Minneapolis v. T.J.
Waconia, No. 27CV0887880 (Hennepin Co., Minn., Dist. Ct. 2008). Minneapolis
alleged that a developer "engaged in a fraudulent residential real estate scheme to
inflate housing prices, took the profits, and then left the area blighted with
foreclosures." LEXIS NEXIS, BACKGROUNDER ON CITIES ATTEMPT TO RECOUP
FORECLOSURE COSTS FROM LENDERS/DEVELOPERS, LEXISNEXIS EMERGING ISSUES
ANALYSIS (June 2009), available at 2009 Emerging Issues 3756. The City won and a
third-party receiver was given possession of the properties. Id. Minneapolis was the
first and only city to date to experience success with such a suit. Id. Nevertheless,
many experts are hesitant to classify this as a victory since now the city is responsible
for maintaining and rehabbing the 141 properties without an award of funds to
rehabilitate them. Id.; Leinwand, supra note 38.
42. City of Cleveland v. Ameriquest Mortg. Sec., Inc., 621 F. Supp.2d 513, 516
(N.D. Ohio 2009) (granting motion to dismiss). The other defendants in this action
are: Bank of America, N.A.; Bear Stearns & Co., Inc.; Citibank, N.A.; Citigroup
Global Markets, Inc.; Countrywide Securities Corporation; Credit Suisse First Boston
LLC; Credit Suisse (USA), Inc.; Deutsche Bank Securities, Inc.; GMAC-RFC
Holding Company; Goldman Sachs & Co.; Greenwich Capital Markets, Inc.; HSBC
Securities (USA), Inc.; JP Morgan Acquisition Corp.; Chase Bank USA, N.A.;
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.; Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc.; Novastar
Mortgage, Inc.; Option One Mortgage Corporation; Washington Mutual Bank; Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A.; Wells Fargo Asset Securities Corporation. Id.
43. City of Cleveland, 621 F. Supp.2d 513.
44. Id. at 516.
45. Under Ohio law, a public nuisance is one that creates "'an unreasonable
interference with a right common to the general public."' Id. at 521 (quoting Brown
v. Scioto County Bd. of Comm'rs, 87 Ohio App. 3d 704, 712 (4th Dist. 1993)). A
qualified nuisance is one that "imposes liability for otherwise lawful actions 'so
negligently or carelessly done [sic] as to create a potential and unreasonable risk of
harm, which in due course results in injury to another."' Id. at 521 (quoting Metzger
v. Pa., Ohio, & Detroit R.R. Co., 146 Ohio St. 406, 410 (1946)).
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establish the traditional elements of a negligence claim.46 The case
was dismissed in part because the court found that the defendants
did not create a public nuisance because subprime lending is a
regulated activity and the defendants had complied with those
regulations.4 7 Furthermore, the court held that the defendants'
encouragement of securitization was too attenuated to the alleged
damages to have proximately caused injury to the City.48  The
allegations in Cleveland's case were so unique that the dismissal
sheds little insight into courts' treatment of other municipal claims
49against lenders and property owners.
Adopting a similar strategy, the City of Buffalo filed suit
against thirty-six lenders in City of Buffalo v. ABN Amro
Mortgage Group, Inc5 ° The plaintiffs alleged that the banks'
46. Id. The elements of a negligence claim are: duty, breach, proximate
causation, and damages. Id.
47. Id. at 526-27.
48. Id. at 533-34. The case was also dismissed because state law forbids
municipalities from regulating mortgages and because the claim was barred by the
economic loss doctrine. Id. at 517-18, 526. See also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1.63
(2009) ("The state solely shall regulate the business of originating, granting, servicing,
and collecting loans and other forms of credit in the state and the manner in which
any such business is conducted, and this regulation shall be in lieu of all other
regulation of such activities by any municipal corporation or other political
subdivision. Any ordinance resolution, regulation, or other action by a municipal
corporation or other political subdivision to regulate, directly or indirectly, the
origination, granting, servicing, or collection of loans or other forms of credit
constitutes a conflict with the Revised Code ... is preempted."). The Ohio Supreme
Court announced the economic loss rule as follows: "[I1n the absence of injury to
persons or damage to their property, economic losses may not be recovered in the
tort theories of strict liability or negligence." Queen City Terminals v. Gen. Am.
Transp. Corp., 73 Ohio St. 3d 609, 614 (1995) (citing Chemtrol Adhesives, Inc. v. Am.
Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 42 Ohio St. 3d 40, 44-45 (1989)).
49. Brescia, Tainted Loans, supra note 4, at 48 n.142.
50. Complaint, City of Buffalo v. ABN Amro Mortgage Group, Inc., (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 2008) (No. 2008002200). The other defendants in the action are: Alden State
Bank; American Business Credit, Inc.; Ameriquest Mortgage Company; Bank of
America, NA; Bank of New York Trust Company NA; Bankers Trust Company of
California, NA N/K/A Deutsche Bank National Trust Company; Beal Bank SSB;
Centex Home Equity Company LLC n/k/a Nationstar Mortgage LLC; The Chase
Manhattan Bank; The Chase Manhattan Bank, n/k/a/ JP Morgan Chase Bank,
National Association; Citibank N.A.; Citifinancial Inc.; Citifinancial Mortgage
Company, Inc.; Citimortgage, Inc.; The Cit Group/Consumer Finance, Inc.; Cityscape
Corp; Credit-Based Asset Servicing & Securitization, LLC; Deutsche Bank National
Trust Company; Empire Development LLC; EMC Mortgage Corporation; FCI
National Fund II, LLC; First Union National Bank n/k/a Wachovia Bank of
Delaware; GE Capital Mortgage Services, Inc.; IMC Mortgage Company; JP Morgan
Chase Bank, n/k/a JP Morgan Chase Bank, National Association; Keybank National
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failure to maintain fifty-seven newly-acquired foreclosed homes
created a public nuisance and alternatively that these lenders
violated local ordinances pertaining to the maintenance of
homes." The City estimated that the properties cost Buffalo
approximately $2 million in maintenance costs and demolition
costs.
52
Buffalo has two main problems in pursuing this action."53
First, abandoned properties are often still in the borrower's name
when the suit is filed because the bank never foreclosed on the
property.4 Second, because mortgages were often securitized, it is
difficult to ascertain who currently owns the mortgage.5 This case
is still pending.
The City of Baltimore used a different strategy by accusing
Wells Fargo of reverse redlining,56 a practice of targeting a specific
community with abusive lending practices. The City alleged that
Wells Fargo disproportionately marketed and sold subprime loans
Association; Longbeach Mortgage Company; Manufacturers and Traders Trust
Company; Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. c/o Merscorp, Inc;
Nationscredit Financial Services Corporation; Norwest Bank Minnesota NA, n/k/a
Wells Fargo Bank of Minnesota; Option One Mortgage Corporation; The Provident
Bank d/b/a PCFS; United Companies Lending Corp.; Washington Mutual Bank FA
n/k/a Washington Mutual Bank. Id. See also Jason Szep, Cities Grapple with Surge in
Abandoned Homes, REUTERS, Mar. 25, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN
1162941020080325 (describing Buffalo's lawsuit against banks as well as the effects
foreclosed homes have had on the city).
51. Complaint, City of Buffalo, supra note 50; see also Brescia, Tainted Loans,
supra note 4, at 48. The City of Cincinnati, Ohio has also pursued a similar public
nuisance claim against Deutsche Bank and Wells Fargo to force them to maintain
four vacant buildings. Dan Monk, City Sues Deutsche Bank, Wells Fargo, Bus.
COURIER OF CIN., Dec. 24, 2008, http://cincinnati.bizjournals.com/cincinnati/stories/
2008/12/22/daily45.html.
52. Szep, supra note 50.




56. Complaint at 1-2, Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A., (D. Md. 2008) (No. L08CV 062), available at 2008 WL 117894; see also Brescia,
supra note 4, at 179 (explaining that reverse redlining occurs where there is demand
for credit by borrowers, and where borrowers have limited knowledge of credit
products and few lending options). The City of Memphis recently filed a similar suit
against Wells Fargo. Michael Powell, Federal Judge Rejects Suit by Baltimore Against
Bank, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9,2010, at All, available at 2010 WLNR 463412.
57. Brescia, supra note 4, at 179-80 (explaining reverse redlining in the context of
the Fair Housing Act).
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in African-American and Latino communities with terms that
compared unfavorably to loans marketed to white communities.
The City argued that not only would such acts constitute a
violation of the Fair Housing Act, but also that such practices lead
to increased foreclosures in minority communities, causing blight
and financial harm to the City. 9 The court dismissed the case in
January 2010, stating that Wells Fargo was only responsible for a
"negligible portion" of the vacant homes in Baltimore 6 The court
noted that "the alleged connection [between Wells Fargo's lending
practices and inner city blight] is even more implausible when
considered against the background of other factors leading to the
deterioration of the inner city, such as extensive unemployment,
lack of educational opportunity and choice, irresponsible
parenting, disrespect for the law, widespread drug use, and
violence.
61
62One case, City of Minneapolis v. T.J. Waconia, is as an
exception to the general trend of cities' unsuccessful suits to
address foreclosure blight. In this case, Minneapolis sued a
developer for an illegal scheme to increase the prices of more than
140 homes that it had purchased and flipped. 63 The city alleged
that by increasing prices in this manner, T.J. Waconia caused the
substantial foreclosures and resulting blight in the neighborhood.
64
Within two weeks of filing suit, the court granted a stipulated
agreement to award damages and to appoint a receiver to manage
and clean up the properties.
58. Complaint, Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, supra note 56.
59. Id. Baltimore claims that Wells Fargo violated sections 3604 and 3605 of the
Fair Housing Act. Id. at 13.
60. Order Granting Motion to Dismiss at 3, Mayor and City Council of Baltimore
v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., (D. Md. 2010) (No. JFM 1:08 CV-00062), available at
2010 WL 46401. See also Powell, supra note 56 (highlighting the order granting
motion to dismiss); Jonathan Stempel, Wells Fargo Mortgage Case in Baltimore
Dismissed, REUTERS, Jan 7, 2010; http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6064
WE20100107 (highlighting the dismissal of the case).
61. Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, supra note 60.
62. City of Minneapolis v. T.J. Waconia No. 27CV0887880 (Hennepin Co., Minn.,
Dist. Ct. 2008); see supra note 41.
63. Kay, supra note 39.
64. Id.
65. Press Release, City of Minneapolis, Minneapolis Gets Court Order
Appointing a Receiver for 141 Homes in North Minneapolis (Apr. 16, 2008),
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Generally, however, municipalities have had little success
actually recovering damages via mass litigation;66 thus, these suits
have not produced the funds needed to address foreclosures and
blight. Furthermore, these actions may diminish the banks'
willingness to lend in certain areas.67 John Mechem of the
Mortgage Bankers Association cautions that these lawsuits are not
the best way to improve cities' housing markets because "[l]enders
simply won't make loans in areas where they perceive a risk of a
lawsuit," and may be uncooperative regarding maintenance of
vacant homes.6 Given the lack of success cities have had to date
and the potential negative consequences of pursuing lenders in this
manner, other municipalities should consider non-litigation
alternatives to deal with foreclosures.
III. NEIGHBORHOOD STABILIZATION PROGRAM AS A SOLUTION
The NSP provides state and local governments with an
alternative source of funding to address foreclosure blight.69 State
and local governments, nonprofit organizations, and "technical
assistance providers"70 have access to NSP funds as part of a
comprehensive plan and collective effort to stabilize
communities." States and municipalities that received NSP funds
http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/mayor/news/20080416newsmayor-minneapolisgets
foreclosurecourtorder.asp.
66. See supra notes pp. 264-66 and notes 47-61.
67. Leinwand, supra note 38.
68. Id.
69. See U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development, Homes and
Communities, Neighborhood Stabilization Program Grants (2010), http://hud.gov/
offices/cpd/communitydevelopment/programs/neighborhoodspg/, [hereinafter NSP
Grants]. See also Johnson & Waldrep, supra note 11, at 208-12 (explaining the
legislative background of NSP).
70. Those eligible for technical assistance grants include a state, a local
government, a nonprofit organization that implements neighborhood stabilization or
community development programs, a professional and technical organization that has
knowledge of the NSP and Community Development Block Grants that will provide
technical assistance services, or any organization including "educational services and
area-wide planning organizations qualified to provide technical assistance to NSP
grantees and others to carry out NSP programs." U.S. DEPT. OF HOUSING AND
URBAN DEVELOPMENT, NOTICE OF FUNDING AVAILABILITY FOR 2009, Docket No.
FR-5313-N-01, http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/communitydevelopment/programs/ne
ighborhoodspg/pdf/nsp-ta-nofa.pdf.
71. See NSP Grants, supra note 69.
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have had some success mobilizing the community around efforts to
mitigate the effects of foreclosures and abandoned properties,"
but no further NSP funds will be awarded unless Congress
authorizes additional funding. 3 Despite its shortcomings, the NSP
should be part of a long-term federal effort aimed at rebuilding
communities.
A. Implementation of NSP Funds
Beginning in September 2008, NSP-1 funds were allocated
to state and local governments to address foreclosure blight.74 In
late 2009, NSP-2 and NSP-TA funding allocations commenced,
allocating NSP-2 funds to state and local governments as well as
non-profits and NSP-TA funds to technical assistance providers.75
For example, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) allocated more than $48.85 million 76 of NSP
1 funds to the State of North Carolina.77 The Department of
Community Assistance of North Carolina (DCA) distributed those
funds to more than 20 local governments, non-profits and other
organizations in early 2009.78 The funding will be used in variety of
ways. For example, the City of Charlotte will use its $2.5 million
grant to promote homeownership by providing down payment
assistance and housing rehabilitation in neighborhoods
substantially affected by foreclosures. 79 The Greensboro Housing
72. See supra Part II.A.
73. U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development, Homes and Communities,
Neighborhood Stabilization Program Grants, Frequently Asked Questions (2008),
http://hud.gov/offices/cpd/communitydevelopment/programs/neighborhoodspg/pdf/ns
pfaq-all.pdf.
74. NSP Grants, supra note 69.
75. NSP Grants, supra note 69.
76. The state received a total of $52.1 million. Five percent of the funding was
allocated to the North Carolina Department of Community Assistance to administer
and monitor the program. Press Release, N.C. Dept. of Commerce, Neighborhood





79. Id. Charlotte received an additional $5.4 million directly from HUD. U.S.
DEPT. OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, HOMES AND COMMUNITIES, STATE
AND LOCAL NSP ALLOCATIONS (current as of August 27, 2009), available at
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Authority, a non-profit organization, will use its $2 million grant to
purchase and rehabilitate thirty foreclosed properties to make
them available as affordable rental housing.80 North Carolina
governments, however, did not receive any portion of the $2
billion of NSP 2 funds in January 2010 because such funding was
largely focused on those states hardest hit by the mortgage crisis,
including California, Florida, and Michigan.s' While it is too soon
to declare the program a total success, officials have high hopes for
the initiatives made possible through NSP funds. 2
Municipalities also received direct NSP funding.83  In
January 2009, Mayor Michael Bloomberg and HUD Secretary
Steve Preston announced that New York City received $24 million
of NSP 1 funding.84 The City embarked on a collaborative effort,
partnering with community organizations to combine NSP funds
with private financing and to jointly administer rehabilitative
http://hud.gov/offices/cpd/communitydevelopment/programs/neighborhoodspg/stateli
nks.cfm.
80. Press Release N.C. Dept. of Commerce, supra note 76.
81. Durham's Rolling Hills/Southside Plans Continue Without Recovery Act
Funding, U.S. FED. NEWS, Jan. 16, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 977846. A national
non-profit organization, Community Builder's Inc. received an award of $79 million
to do work in Illinois, Massachusetts, North Carolina, New York, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Virginia, and the District of Columbia. Mary Moore, The Community
Builders Lands $79m, BOSTON Bus. J., Jan. 15, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 920110.
$4.6 million of that award was designated for North Carolina. U.S. DEPT. OF
HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, HOMES AND COMMUNITIES, NSP 2 AWARDS
BY STATE, available at http://hud.gov/offices/cpd/communitydevelopment/programs/
neighborhoodspg/nsp2grantchart.pdf.
82. See, e.g., Press Release 020-09, New York City Government, Mayor
Bloomberg and HUD Secretary Preston Announce Federal Approval of $24 Million
for New York City to Purchase, Rehab and Resell Foreclosed Homes to Income-




(announcing collaborative efforts to rehabilitate New York communities with NSP
funds); Richard Mclntire, Baltimore Receives Millions in Recovery Act Grants and
Energy Stimulus Funds, EXAMINER, Jan. 22, 2009, http://www.examiner.com/x-27945-
Baltimore-City-Buzz-Examiner-y2010mld22-Baltimore-receives-millions-in-
Recovery-Act-grants-and-energy-stimulus-funds (discussing award and use of NSP
funds in Baltimore).
83. See infra pp. 269 and 271 and notes 84 and 95.
84. U.S. DEPT. OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, supra note 81. See
generally Press Release 020-09, supra note 82 (announcing receipt of NSP funds,
implementation of housing programs, and uses of funds).
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programs." In addition to the $24 million of NSP funds, the City
expected to raise $32 million in private financing to repay lenders
once rehabilitated homes are sold.86 The Battery Park City
Authority Housing Trust Fund gave $6 million to the City to
secure financing.
The money will be allocated to areas of the City most
affected by foreclosures. 8  The City hopes to renovate 115
buildings and provide 250 to 300 families with homes.89 NSP funds
will also augment the Mayor's New Housing Marketplace Plan, a
ten-year plan to create affordable housing units in the city.9° In
January 2010, the City received more than $20 million in
additional NSP 2 funds.9"
New York City's Department of Housing Preservation and
Development, the Center for NYC Neighborhoods, and Restored
Homes will jointly administer the City's NSP funds.92 The
National Community Stabilization Trust will help to identify bank-
owned properties that failed to sell at foreclosure auctions to
determine if they should be purchased with NSP funds.93 New
York City's program exemplifies some of the potential strengths of
this federally funded program because it puts local governments in
control.94 Local governments are more capable of effectively
responding to foreclosures on a city-specific or even a
85. Press Release 020-09, supra note 82.




90. Id. For more information on Bloomberg's ten-year plan, see THE CITY OF
N.Y., THE NEW HOUSING MARKETPLACE, available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/hpd/
downloads/pdf/10yearHMplan.pdf.
91. Press Release 019-10, Mayor Bloomberg Announces New York City To
Receive More Than $20 Million in Stimulus Funds from U.S. Department of Housing





92. Press Release 020-09, supra note 82.
93. Id.
94. See generally KINGSLEY ET AL., supra note 2, at 23-24 (suggesting that local
governments that focus on the foreclosure blight on a local level will be more
successful in addressing problems created by the mortgage crisis).
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neighborhood-specific level than state government officials
because state officials "are too far removed from the local scene." 95
Prior to HUD's allocation of NSP 1 funds, critics suggested that
state and local governments were ill-suited to use funds
effectively.96 The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of
2009,97 however, may have addressed concerns about effective use
of funds because it implemented a competitive bidding process for
NSP 2 where awards were based in part on "project quality." 98
Furthermore, organizing a community-wide initiative to address
foreclosure blight, partially funded by the NSP, gives local
governments the ability to address these problems efficiently and
comprehensively.99
B. Limitations of NSP
While the NSP could potentially provide significant
assistance to cities facing substantial foreclosure blight, the
program's prospects for success are limited by the funding
previously allocated to the program. '°° By fall 2008, there were
approximately 1.35 million foreclosed homes nationwide. 0 1
Assuming the median price of a home is $200,000, the program
could only fund the purchase of 30,000 foreclosed homes, or two
percent of the total, given the $5.9 billion allocated in NSP 1 and
95. Id. at 24.
96. ALAN MALLACH, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, STABILIZING COMMUNITIES:




97. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-005, 123
Stat. 217 (2009). See Johnson & Waldrep, supra note 11, at 208-12 (explaining
background on American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009).
98. EUGENE BOYD & OSCAR R. GONZALES, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT BLOCK GRANTS: NEIGHBORHOOD
STABILIZATION PROGRAM; ASSISTANCE TO COMMUNITIES AFFECTED BY
FORECLOSURES 8 (Mar. 13, 2009).
99. KINGSLEY ET AL., supra note 2, at 23.
100. Robbie Whelan, Lull in Baltimore-Towson Metropolitan Area Foreclosures
May be Temporary, THE DAILY RECORD (Baltimore), Jul 31, 2009, available at 2009
WLNR 15013187.
101. BOYD & GONZALES, supra note 98, at 11.
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NSP 2.'02 Funding must also be provided to rehabilitate purchased
homes. 3
While cities and states can provide extra funding, the NSP
program is still insufficient to fully address the effects of the
mortgage crisis. 1' 4 The program is a short-term solution to a long-
term problem.105 Baltimore, for example, received only $4.1
million in funding from NSP 1'°6 and no funding, despite its
application, from NSP 2.'07 The NSP funds will hopefully enable
Baltimore to accomplish the first phase of its neighborhood
stabilization project: purchasing, rehabilitating, and selling eighty-
eight foreclosed homes in eleven stable, middle-class
neighborhoods that are at risk of declining property values due to
foreclosures.1°8  Following the rehabilitation process, the city
planned to sell abandoned or foreclosed homes that have been
vacant for fewer than 200 days to low and moderate income buyers
and non-profit organizations. 109 But because the city's application
for $5 million of NSP 2 funds was rejected," it seems unlikely that
Baltimore will be able to complete its planned projects. While
Baltimore's need for government funding is less significant than
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Robbie Whelan, Baltimore to Spend $4.3M in Federal Money to Fight
Foreclosures, THE DAILY RECORD (Baltimore), Apr 9, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR
8149875.
105. See Enterprise Community Partners, Inc., Comprehensive Foreclosure
Prevention and Stabilization Approaches: Connecting the Homeownership
Affordability Stability Plan to the Neighborhood Stabilization Program, Mar. 4, 2009,
http://www.enterprisecommunity.org/public-policy/foreclosure-prevention/document
s/cfpsa-paper.pdf (stating that foreclosure problems are so significant that even with
the help of NSP funds, local communities are ill-equipped to appropriately address
the issue); Alan Berube & Allan Mallach, Foreclosure and Stimulus: What's at Stake
for America's Neighborhoods, BROOKINGS, Feb. 9, 2009, http://www.brookings.edu/
opinions/2009/0209_stimulusberube.aspx (suggesting that NSP funds needed to be
enlarged to provide significant assistance to local governments and communities).
106. Whelan, Baltimore to Spend $4.3M in Federal Money to Fight Foreclosures,
supra note 104.
107. U.S. DEPT. OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, supra note 79.
108. Whelan, Baltimore to Spend $4.1M in Federal Money to Fight Foreclosures,
supra note 104. Baltimore will have $46,500 in NSP funds per property. Id.
109. Id.
110. Whelan, Lull in Baltimore-Towson Metropolitan Area Foreclosures May be




other large cities,"' $4.1 million is still insufficient to accomplish
the city's goals with respect to its foreclosure problem."2 A New
York real estate attorney remarked that the funding "is a drop in
the bucket ... [n]ationwide, the numbers are so astronomical that
there's no way to stabilize any area with the amount of funds that
are being offered.""' 3
NSP's success may also be somewhat hindered because
HUD, which oversees the program, is overburdened in its
administrative capacity.' 4 HUD oversees both NSP 1 and NSP 2 in
addition to the standard Community Development Block Grant program
and disaster recovery grants."' Furthermore, HUD may only use $10
million, or one percent of NSP 2 funds, to supervise the program.116
Finally, the required distribution and use schedules for NSP
funds, as prescribed by the Housing and Economic Recovery Act
of 2008,"' have been criticized as overly ambitious and "hasty."''
8
For example, all NSP allocations had to be distributed by the first
quarter of 2009."9 Once distributed, the recipients have only
eighteen months to make use of the funds.'20 Thus, some experts
are doubtful that many local governments will have enough time
to draft economical and efficient community stabilization plans. 2'
IV. CONCLUSION
Litigation aimed at recovering maintenance costs and lost
tax revenue is an indirect and inefficient way to address
foreclosure blight. The NSP provided communities with a
111. Whelan, Baltimore to Spend $4.3M in Federal Money to Fight Foreclosures,
supra note 104 (quoting Baltimore Housing Commissioner Paul T. Graziano).
112. Id.
113. Id. Edward Mermelstein works with lenders on foreclosure matters. Id.
114. Boyd & Gonzales, supra note 98, at 11.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 8.
117. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 111-005, 123 Stat.
217 (2009). See also Johnson & Waldrep, supra note 11, at 208-12 (explaining
background on Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008).
118. KINGSLEY ET AL., supra note 2, at 36.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See generally id. ("[G]iven the haste with which funds must be spent, there
are doubts that many jurisdictions will be able to spend them wisely.").
2010]
274 NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE [Vol. 14
comprehensive and more efficient alternative to litigation.
Nevertheless, because it is too soon to speculate about the overall
success of NSP plans, and given the shortcomings of the existing
government program, it may be premature to advocate for further
funding of the NSP in its current form. Neighborhood stabilization
should be a long term goal, and, therefore, hasty short-term capital
injections are insufficient to address the problem. Congress should
authorize recurring funding to the NSP but only after amending
the requirements for awarding and using funds.
S. ADELINE MCKINNEY
